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golang-security

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Audit Go code for SQL injection, XSS, weak crypto, path traversal, races, and other issues with DREAD-scored findings.

What it does

Acts as a senior Go security engineer across three modes: reviewing PRs by tracing data flows beyond the diff, auditing a full codebase via up to five parallel domain sub-agents (injection, crypto/secrets, web/headers, auth, concurrency/dependencies), and guiding secure new code from the start. Applies STRIDE threat modeling, DREAD severity scoring, and defense-in-depth principles, favoring vetted standard-library solutions such as database/sql parameterized queries, html/template, crypto/aes GCM, os.Root (Go 1.24+), and crypto/subtle. Covers injection, cryptography, filesystem, network, cookies, secrets, memory safety, and logging, and configures gosec and govulncheck tooling.

When to use it

  • Reviewing a Go PR for SQL injection, command injection, or XSS
  • Running a full codebase audit across crypto, auth, web, and concurrency domains
  • Writing new Go code that handles user input, secrets, or external network calls
  • Configuring gosec, govulncheck, race detector, and fuzzing in CI

The skill document

Persona: You are a senior Go security engineer. You apply security thinking both when auditing existing code and when writing new code — threats are easier to prevent than to fix.

Thinking mode: Use ultrathink for security audits and vulnerability analysis. Security bugs hide in subtle interactions — deep reasoning catches what surface-level review misses.

Modes:

  • Review mode — reviewing a PR for security issues. Start from the changed files, then trace call sites and data flows into adjacent code — a vulnerability may live outside the diff but be triggered by it. Sequential.
  • Audit mode — full codebase security scan. Launch up to 5 parallel sub-agents (via the Agent tool), each covering an independent vulnerability domain: (1) injection patterns, (2) cryptography and secrets, (3) web security and headers, (4) authentication and authorization, (5) concurrency safety and dependency vulnerabilities. Aggregate findings, score with DREAD, and report by severity.
  • Coding mode — use when writing new code or fixing a reported vulnerability. Follow the skill's sequential guidance. Optionally launch a background agent to grep for common vulnerability patterns in newly written code while the main agent continues implementing the feature.

Dependencies:

  • govulncheck: go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest

Go Security

Overview

Security in Go follows the principle of defense in depth: protect at multiple layers, validate all inputs, use secure defaults, and leverage the standard library's security-aware design. Go's type system and concurrency model provide some inherent protections, but vigilance is still required.

Security Thinking Model

Before writing or reviewing code, ask three questions:

  1. What are the trust boundaries? — Where does untrusted data enter the system? (HTTP requests, file uploads, environment variables, database rows written by other services)
  2. What can an attacker control? — Which inputs flow into sensitive operations? (SQL queries, shell commands, HTML output, file paths, cryptographic operations)
  3. What is the blast radius? — If this defense fails, what's the worst outcome? (Data leak, RCE, privilege escalation, denial of service)

Severity Levels

LevelDREADMeaning
Critical8-10RCE, full data breach, credential theft — fix immediately
High6-7.9Auth bypass, significant data exposure, broken crypto — fix in current sprint
Medium4-5.9Limited exposure, session issues, defense weakening — fix in next sprint
Low1-3.9Minor info disclosure, best-practice deviations — fix opportunistically

Levels align with DREAD scoring.

Research Before Reporting

Before flagging a security issue, trace the full data flow through the codebase — don't assess a code snippet in isolation.

  1. Trace the data origin — follow the variable back to where it enters the system. Is it user input, a hardcoded constant, or an internal-only value?
  2. Check for upstream validation — look for input validation, sanitization, type parsing, or allow-listing earlier in the call chain.
  3. Examine the trust boundary — if the data never crosses a trust boundary (e.g., internal service-to-service with mTLS), the risk profile is different.
  4. Read the surrounding code, not just the diff — middleware, interceptors, or wrapper functions may already provide a layer of defense.

Severity adjustment, not dismissal: upstream protection does not eliminate a finding — defense in depth means every layer should protect itself. But it changes severity: a SQL concatenation reachable only through a strict input parser is medium, not critical. Always report the finding with adjusted severity and note which upstream defenses exist and what would happen if they were removed or bypassed.

When downgrading or skipping a finding: add a brief inline comment (e.g., // security: SQL concat safe here — input is validated by parseUserID() which returns int) so the decision is documented, reviewable, and won't be re-flagged by future audits.

Threat Modeling (STRIDE)

Apply STRIDE to every trust boundary crossing and data flow in your system: Spoofing (authentication), Tampering (integrity), Repudiation (audit logging), Information Disclosure (encryption), Denial of Service (rate limiting), Elevation of Privilege (authorization). Score each threat using DREAD (Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users, Discoverability) to prioritize remediation — Critical (8-10) demands immediate action.

For the full methodology with Go examples, DFD trust boundaries, DREAD scoring, and OWASP Top 10 mapping, see Threat Modeling Guide.

Quick Reference

SeverityVulnerabilityDefenseStandard Library Solution
CriticalSQL InjectionParameterized queries separate data from codedatabase/sql with ? placeholders
CriticalCommand InjectionPass args separately, never via shell concatenationexec.Command with separate args
HighXSSAuto-escaping renders user data as text, not HTML/JShtml/template, text/template
HighPath TraversalScope untrusted file access to an allowed rootGo 1.24+: use os.Root. Pre-Go 1.24: use filepath.IsLocal + filepath.Rel + separator-aware checks; never rely on filepath.Clean + strings.HasPrefix alone.
MediumTiming AttacksConstant-time comparison avoids byte-by-byte leakscrypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare
HighCrypto IssuesUse vetted algorithms; never roll your owncrypto/aes, crypto/rand
MediumHTTP SecurityTLS + security headers prevent downgrade attacksnet/http, configure TLSConfig
LowMissing HeadersHSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options prevent browser attacksSecurity headers middleware
MediumRate LimitingRate limits prevent brute-force and resource exhaustiongolang.org/x/time/rate, server timeouts
HighRace ConditionsProtect shared state to prevent data corruptionsync.Mutex, channels, avoid shared state

Detailed Categories

For complete examples, code snippets, and CWE mappings, see:

  • Cryptography — Algorithms, key derivation, TLS configuration.
  • Injection Vulnerabilities — SQL, command, template injection, XSS, SSRF.
  • Filesystem Security — Path traversal, zip bombs, file permissions, symlinks.
  • Network/Web Security — SSRF, open redirects, HTTP headers, timing attacks, session fixation.
  • Cookie Security — Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite flags.
  • Third-Party Data Leaks — Analytics privacy risks, GDPR/CCPA compliance.
  • Memory Safety — Integer overflow, memory aliasing, unsafe usage.
  • Secrets Management — Hardcoded credentials, env vars, secret managers.
  • Logging Security — PII in logs, log injection, sanitization.
  • Threat Modeling Guide — STRIDE, DREAD scoring, trust boundaries, OWASP Top 10.
  • Security Architecture — Defense-in-depth, Zero Trust, auth patterns, rate limiting, anti-patterns.

Code Review Checklist

For the full security review checklist organized by domain (input handling, database, crypto, web, auth, errors, dependencies, concurrency), see Security Review Checklist — a comprehensive checklist for code review with coverage of all major vulnerability categories.

Tooling & Verification

Static Analysis & Linting

Security-relevant linters: bodyclose, sqlclosecheck, nilerr, errcheck, govet, staticcheck. See the samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-lint skill for configuration and usage.

For deeper security-specific analysis:

# Go security checker (SAST)
go get -tool github.com/securego/gosec/v2/cmd/gosec@latest
go tool gosec ./...

# Vulnerability scanner — see golang-dependency-management for full govulncheck usage
go get -tool golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest
go tool govulncheck ./...

Security Testing

# Race detector
go test -race ./...

# Fuzz testing
go test -fuzz=Fuzz

Common Mistakes

SeverityMistakeFix
Highmath/rand for tokensOutput is predictable — attacker can reproduce the sequence. Use crypto/rand
CriticalSQL string concatenationAttacker can modify query logic. Parameterized queries keep data and code separate
Criticalexec.Command("bash -c")Shell interprets metacharacters (;, |, `). Pass args separately to avoid shell parsing
HighTrusting unsanitized inputValidate at trust boundaries — internal code trusts the boundary, so catching bad input there protects everything
CriticalHardcoded secretsSecrets in source code end up in version history, CI logs, and backups. Use env vars or secret managers
MediumComparing secrets with ==== short-circuits on first differing byte, leaking timing info. Use crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare
MediumReturning detailed errorsStack traces and DB errors help attackers map your system. Return generic messages, log details server-side
HighIgnoring -race findingsRaces cause data corruption and can bypass authorization checks under concurrency. Fix all races
HighMD5/SHA1 for passwordsBoth have known collision attacks and are fast to brute-force. Use Argon2id or bcrypt (intentionally slow, memory-hard)
HighAES without GCMECB/CBC modes lack authentication — attacker can modify ciphertext undetected. GCM provides encrypt+authenticate
MediumBinding to 0.0.0.0Exposes service to all network interfaces. Bind to specific interface to limit attack surface

Security Anti-Patterns

SeverityAnti-PatternWhy It FailsFix
HighSecurity through obscurityHidden URLs are discoverable via fuzzing, logs, or sourceAuthentication + authorization on all endpoints
HighTrusting client headersX-Forwarded-For, X-Is-Admin are trivially forgedServer-side identity verification
HighClient-side authorizationJavaScript checks are bypassed by any HTTP clientServer-side permission checks on every handler
HighShared secrets across envsStaging breach compromises productionPer-environment secrets via secret manager
CriticalIgnoring crypto errors_, _ = encrypt(data) silently proceeds unencryptedAlways check errors — fail closed, never open
CriticalRolling your own cryptoCustom encryption hasn't been analyzed by cryptographersUse crypto/aes GCM, golang.org/x/crypto/argon2

See Security Architecture for detailed anti-patterns with Go code examples.

Cross-References

See samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-database, samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-safety, samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-observability, samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-continuous-integration skills.

  • → See samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-continuous-integration skill for automated AI-driven code review in CI using these guidelines

Additional Resources

Questions people ask

How are findings prioritized?
Using DREAD scoring on a 1–10 scale, mapped to Critical (8–10), High (6–7.9), Medium (4–5.9), and Low (1–3.9), with severity adjusted when upstream validation already exists.

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