Data & analysis

DCL Policy Enforcer

Try it

Get a verdict, confidence score, and on-chain tx_hash for LLM or agent output via a paid x402 MCP audit.

What it does

Calls the DCL Trust Oracle MCP server to evaluate an LLM or agent response and returns a COMMIT/NO_COMMIT verdict, confidence score, drift mode, and a tx_hash from a hash-chained audit log. Each call is metered and settled in USDC on Base via the x402 protocol — no subscription or account, only a wallet. A free instruction-only checklist is also included for manual offline review against transparency, jailbreak, financial, medical, data-handling, and PII patterns.

When to use it

  • Gate a risky agent action before execution
  • Screen LLM output for jailbreak or instruction-override attempts
  • Run a baseline safety or content-drift check
  • Use the free checklist for a manual offline review

The skill document

DCL Policy Enforcer — Leibniz Layer™

Publisher: @daririnch · Fronesis Labs Version: 3.1.0 Part of: Leibniz Layer™ Security Suite MCP endpoint: https://mcp.fronesislabs.com/mcp


⚠️ This skill now calls a live, paid service

Starting with v3.0.0, the core evaluation runs on Fronesis Labs' DCL Trust Oracle MCP server — a real backend, not a local simulation. Each paid tool call is metered and settled on-chain via the x402 protocol in USDC on the Base network. There is no subscription and no account: the calling agent (or its wallet-enabled MCP client) pays per call at the price listed below.

A free, instruction-only checklist is still included further down this document for anyone who wants a manual, no-payment, no-network-call review instead.


What this skill does

Calls the DCL Trust Oracle to evaluate an AI agent's or LLM's output and returns a verdict (COMMIT / NO_COMMIT), a confidence score, and a cryptographic audit record (tx_hash) written to a tamper-evident, hash-chained log that stores only hashes — never the raw text.

When to use this skill

  • Gate a risky agent action before it executes
  • Screen an LLM output for jailbreak / instruction-override attempts
  • Run a baseline safety pass, or a content-quality / drift check
  • Get a durable, on-chain-anchored audit trail for a decision

Live tools (paid, USDC on Base via x402)

MCP toolPriceWhat it runs
dcl_evaluate_fast$0.01Default policy (3 forbidden phrases), 0.7 min-confidence — the low-cost first-pass gate
dcl_evaluate_strict$0.05Broader strict policy — union of default + anti-jailbreak + safety phrases (8 total), 0.85 min-confidence
dcl_evaluate_jailbreak$0.02Anti-jailbreak policy — 6 instruction-override/persona-hijack phrases, 0.8 min-confidence
dcl_evaluate_safety$0.01Safety policy — 2 disclaimer phrases plus a required "AI"-disclosure check, 0.75 min-confidence
dcl_evaluate_quality$0.03Content-quality policy — 12 absolutist/unverifiable-claim phrases, 0.85 min-confidence
dcl_evaluate_batch$0.10Evaluate a list of items in one call, each with its own policy
dcl_pipeline_start$0.05Returns a pipeline_id reference for your own client-side grouping of a multi-step check sequence
dcl_audit_decode$0.10Retrieve a past record by tx_hash
dcl_audit_decode_deep$0.50Same, plus full chain-integrity verification and drift context

Prices are set server-side and may change; the MCP tool descriptions returned by the server at call time are always the source of truth.

Note on policy selection

Each tool runs a distinct built-in policy — they are not just price tiers of the same check. dcl_evaluate_fast and dcl_evaluate_strict share the same category (general-purpose gate) but differ in coverage and confidence bar; dcl_evaluate_jailbreak, dcl_evaluate_safety, and dcl_evaluate_quality are narrower, single-concern checks. None of the single-item tools accept a policy parameter — to target a specific policy per item, use dcl_evaluate_batch, where each item may carry its own policy string (default, strict, anti_jailbreak, safety, or content_quality).

dcl_pipeline_start currently issues an identifier only — it does not link subsequent evaluate_* calls to it server-side. Use it for your own client-side grouping, not as an automatic cross-call session tracker.


Connecting to the live server

Add the MCP server to your client config (Claude Desktop, Cursor, or any MCP-compatible agent):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "dcl-trust-oracle": {
      "url": "https://mcp.fronesislabs.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}

Payment is handled automatically for x402-capable clients; clients without native x402 support fall back to a guided payment flow. No API key or account signup is required — only a wallet capable of paying in USDC on Base.

Calling a tool

result = dcl_evaluate_jailbreak(
    response=agent_output,
    agent_id="my-agent-01",
)

if result["verdict"] == "NO_COMMIT":
    block_or_regenerate(result["reason"])
else:
    log_audit(result["tx_hash"])

Output shape (all evaluation tools)

{
  "verdict": "COMMIT | NO_COMMIT",
  "confidence": 0.0,
  "reason": "string",
  "tx_hash": "string",
  "chain_index": 0,
  "input_hash": "string",
  "policy_version": "string",
  "drift_mode": "NORMAL | WARNING | ESCALATION | BLOCK",
  "drift_score": 0.0
}

Only input_hash (a hash of the evaluated text) is stored — the raw response itself is never persisted server-side.


Free instruction-only checklist (no network call, no charge)

If you'd rather not make a paid call — for a quick manual pass, or when offline — work through the checklist below entirely inside the agent's own context. Nothing here contacts any server.

Verdict logic

ConditionVerdict
Any critical findingNO_COMMIT
Any major findingNO_COMMIT
No findingsCOMMIT

Transparency & Manipulation Patterns

  • Output claims to be human or denies being an AI when sincerely asked
  • Output attempts to manipulate the user through psychological techniques
  • Output assigns social scores or makes discriminatory assessments of individuals
  • Output impersonates a real person or official authority
  • Output lacks a transparency disclosure appropriate to a high-stakes context

Instruction-Override Patterns (jailbreak)

  • Output contains instruction-override phrases directed at the model itself
  • Output adopts an unrestricted persona (DAN, STAN, or similar)
  • Output acknowledges having bypassed or disabled safety measures
  • Output contains encoded or obfuscated instructions for harmful actions
  • Output instructs the user on how to jailbreak or manipulate AI systems

Financial Disclosure Patterns

  • Output guarantees specific investment returns
  • Output gives a specific buy/sell/hold call without a risk disclaimer
  • Output gives personalized investment advice without a professional-referral note
  • Output makes a performance claim with no supporting disclosure

Medical Disclosure Patterns

  • Output makes a specific diagnostic claim about a named condition
  • Output gives specific medication dosage guidance
  • Output recommends stopping or changing a prescribed medication
  • Output presents itself as a substitute for professional consultation
  • Output is missing a referral note to a qualified healthcare professional

Data Handling Patterns

  • Output proposes retaining personal data with no stated basis
  • Output suggests sharing personal data with a third party without consent
  • Output implies selling or monetizing personal data
  • Output dismisses a data-subject rights request
  • Output proposes processing sensitive personal data without explicit consent

PII Surface Patterns

  • Output contains email addresses
  • Output contains phone numbers
  • Output contains national ID or SSN-shaped strings
  • Output contains bank card PANs or IBANs
  • Output contains crypto wallet addresses
  • Output contains IP addresses

These checklists describe recurring patterns worth flagging — they are a heuristic aid for a human or agent reviewer, not a certification against any specific law or standard.


Where Policy Enforcer fits in the DCL pipeline

Untrusted input
        │
        ▼
DCL Prompt Firewall        ← blocks malicious input
        │ COMMIT
        ▼
      LLM
        │
        ▼
DCL Policy Enforcer        ← this skill (live paid check, or free checklist)
        │ COMMIT
        ▼
DCL Sentinel Trace         ← PII redaction
        │ COMMIT
        ▼
DCL Secret Leak Detector   ← credential scan
        │ COMMIT
        ▼
DCL Semantic Drift Guard   ← hallucination check
        │ IN_COMMIT
        ▼
Safe to deliver

Privacy & Data Policy

Operated by Fronesis Labs. For the live tools: only a hash of the evaluated text (input_hash) and the verdict metadata are written to the audit chain — the raw response is never stored. For the free checklist: everything runs inside the agent's own context; nothing is transmitted anywhere.

Full policy: https://fronesislabs.com/#privacy · Browse the full DCL Security Suite: hub.fronesislabs.com · Questions: support@fronesislabs.com


  • dcl-prompt-firewall — Input-layer injection and jailbreak detection
  • dcl-sentinel-trace — PII redaction
  • dcl-secret-leak-detector — Credential and API key scan
  • dcl-semantic-drift-guard — Hallucination and grounding check

Leibniz Layer™ · Fronesis Labs · fronesislabs.com

Questions people ask

Does every call cost money?
Yes — the live evaluate and audit tools are paid, ranging from $0.01 to $0.50 per call depending on the tool. A free instruction-only checklist is included for manual review with no network call.
What does the output contain, and is the raw text stored?
Each call returns verdict (COMMIT/NO_COMMIT), confidence, reason, tx_hash, chain_index, input_hash, policy_version, drift_mode, and drift_score. Only a hash of the evaluated text is written to the audit chain — the raw response is never persisted server-side.
Can I target a specific policy per item?
The single-item evaluate tools do not accept a policy parameter; each one runs its own built-in policy. To pick a policy per item, use dcl_evaluate_batch, where each item may carry a policy string such as default, strict, anti_jailbreak, safety, or content_quality.

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