Pre-execution injection and jailbreak screening with paid x402 settlement and hash-chained audit.
Data & analysis
DCL Policy Enforcer
Try itGet a verdict, confidence score, and on-chain tx_hash for LLM or agent output via a paid x402 MCP audit.
What it does
Calls the DCL Trust Oracle MCP server to evaluate an LLM or agent response and returns a COMMIT/NO_COMMIT verdict, confidence score, drift mode, and a tx_hash from a hash-chained audit log. Each call is metered and settled in USDC on Base via the x402 protocol — no subscription or account, only a wallet. A free instruction-only checklist is also included for manual offline review against transparency, jailbreak, financial, medical, data-handling, and PII patterns.
When to use it
- Gate a risky agent action before execution
- Screen LLM output for jailbreak or instruction-override attempts
- Run a baseline safety or content-drift check
- Use the free checklist for a manual offline review
The skill document
DCL Policy Enforcer — Leibniz Layer™
Publisher: @daririnch · Fronesis Labs
Version: 3.1.0
Part of: Leibniz Layer™ Security Suite
MCP endpoint: https://mcp.fronesislabs.com/mcp
⚠️ This skill now calls a live, paid service
Starting with v3.0.0, the core evaluation runs on Fronesis Labs' DCL Trust Oracle MCP server — a real backend, not a local simulation. Each paid tool call is metered and settled on-chain via the x402 protocol in USDC on the Base network. There is no subscription and no account: the calling agent (or its wallet-enabled MCP client) pays per call at the price listed below.
A free, instruction-only checklist is still included further down this document for anyone who wants a manual, no-payment, no-network-call review instead.
What this skill does
Calls the DCL Trust Oracle to evaluate an AI agent's or LLM's output and returns a verdict
(COMMIT / NO_COMMIT), a confidence score, and a cryptographic audit record (tx_hash)
written to a tamper-evident, hash-chained log that stores only hashes — never the raw text.
When to use this skill
- Gate a risky agent action before it executes
- Screen an LLM output for jailbreak / instruction-override attempts
- Run a baseline safety pass, or a content-quality / drift check
- Get a durable, on-chain-anchored audit trail for a decision
Live tools (paid, USDC on Base via x402)
| MCP tool | Price | What it runs |
|---|---|---|
dcl_evaluate_fast | $0.01 | Default policy (3 forbidden phrases), 0.7 min-confidence — the low-cost first-pass gate |
dcl_evaluate_strict | $0.05 | Broader strict policy — union of default + anti-jailbreak + safety phrases (8 total), 0.85 min-confidence |
dcl_evaluate_jailbreak | $0.02 | Anti-jailbreak policy — 6 instruction-override/persona-hijack phrases, 0.8 min-confidence |
dcl_evaluate_safety | $0.01 | Safety policy — 2 disclaimer phrases plus a required "AI"-disclosure check, 0.75 min-confidence |
dcl_evaluate_quality | $0.03 | Content-quality policy — 12 absolutist/unverifiable-claim phrases, 0.85 min-confidence |
dcl_evaluate_batch | $0.10 | Evaluate a list of items in one call, each with its own policy |
dcl_pipeline_start | $0.05 | Returns a pipeline_id reference for your own client-side grouping of a multi-step check sequence |
dcl_audit_decode | $0.10 | Retrieve a past record by tx_hash |
dcl_audit_decode_deep | $0.50 | Same, plus full chain-integrity verification and drift context |
Prices are set server-side and may change; the MCP tool descriptions returned by the server at call time are always the source of truth.
Note on policy selection
Each tool runs a distinct built-in policy — they are not just price tiers of the same check.
dcl_evaluate_fast and dcl_evaluate_strict share the same category (general-purpose gate)
but differ in coverage and confidence bar; dcl_evaluate_jailbreak, dcl_evaluate_safety, and
dcl_evaluate_quality are narrower, single-concern checks. None of the single-item tools accept
a policy parameter — to target a specific policy per item, use dcl_evaluate_batch, where each
item may carry its own policy string (default, strict, anti_jailbreak, safety, or
content_quality).
dcl_pipeline_start currently issues an identifier only — it does not link subsequent
evaluate_* calls to it server-side. Use it for your own client-side grouping, not as an
automatic cross-call session tracker.
Connecting to the live server
Add the MCP server to your client config (Claude Desktop, Cursor, or any MCP-compatible agent):
{
"mcpServers": {
"dcl-trust-oracle": {
"url": "https://mcp.fronesislabs.com/mcp"
}
}
}
Payment is handled automatically for x402-capable clients; clients without native x402 support fall back to a guided payment flow. No API key or account signup is required — only a wallet capable of paying in USDC on Base.
Calling a tool
result = dcl_evaluate_jailbreak(
response=agent_output,
agent_id="my-agent-01",
)
if result["verdict"] == "NO_COMMIT":
block_or_regenerate(result["reason"])
else:
log_audit(result["tx_hash"])
Output shape (all evaluation tools)
{
"verdict": "COMMIT | NO_COMMIT",
"confidence": 0.0,
"reason": "string",
"tx_hash": "string",
"chain_index": 0,
"input_hash": "string",
"policy_version": "string",
"drift_mode": "NORMAL | WARNING | ESCALATION | BLOCK",
"drift_score": 0.0
}
Only input_hash (a hash of the evaluated text) is stored — the raw response itself is never
persisted server-side.
Free instruction-only checklist (no network call, no charge)
If you'd rather not make a paid call — for a quick manual pass, or when offline — work through the checklist below entirely inside the agent's own context. Nothing here contacts any server.
Verdict logic
| Condition | Verdict |
|---|---|
Any critical finding | NO_COMMIT |
Any major finding | NO_COMMIT |
| No findings | COMMIT |
Transparency & Manipulation Patterns
- Output claims to be human or denies being an AI when sincerely asked
- Output attempts to manipulate the user through psychological techniques
- Output assigns social scores or makes discriminatory assessments of individuals
- Output impersonates a real person or official authority
- Output lacks a transparency disclosure appropriate to a high-stakes context
Instruction-Override Patterns (jailbreak)
- Output contains instruction-override phrases directed at the model itself
- Output adopts an unrestricted persona (DAN, STAN, or similar)
- Output acknowledges having bypassed or disabled safety measures
- Output contains encoded or obfuscated instructions for harmful actions
- Output instructs the user on how to jailbreak or manipulate AI systems
Financial Disclosure Patterns
- Output guarantees specific investment returns
- Output gives a specific buy/sell/hold call without a risk disclaimer
- Output gives personalized investment advice without a professional-referral note
- Output makes a performance claim with no supporting disclosure
Medical Disclosure Patterns
- Output makes a specific diagnostic claim about a named condition
- Output gives specific medication dosage guidance
- Output recommends stopping or changing a prescribed medication
- Output presents itself as a substitute for professional consultation
- Output is missing a referral note to a qualified healthcare professional
Data Handling Patterns
- Output proposes retaining personal data with no stated basis
- Output suggests sharing personal data with a third party without consent
- Output implies selling or monetizing personal data
- Output dismisses a data-subject rights request
- Output proposes processing sensitive personal data without explicit consent
PII Surface Patterns
- Output contains email addresses
- Output contains phone numbers
- Output contains national ID or SSN-shaped strings
- Output contains bank card PANs or IBANs
- Output contains crypto wallet addresses
- Output contains IP addresses
These checklists describe recurring patterns worth flagging — they are a heuristic aid for a human or agent reviewer, not a certification against any specific law or standard.
Where Policy Enforcer fits in the DCL pipeline
Untrusted input
│
▼
DCL Prompt Firewall ← blocks malicious input
│ COMMIT
▼
LLM
│
▼
DCL Policy Enforcer ← this skill (live paid check, or free checklist)
│ COMMIT
▼
DCL Sentinel Trace ← PII redaction
│ COMMIT
▼
DCL Secret Leak Detector ← credential scan
│ COMMIT
▼
DCL Semantic Drift Guard ← hallucination check
│ IN_COMMIT
▼
Safe to deliver
Privacy & Data Policy
Operated by Fronesis Labs. For the live tools: only a hash of the evaluated text
(input_hash) and the verdict metadata are written to the audit chain — the raw response is
never stored. For the free checklist: everything runs inside the agent's own context; nothing is
transmitted anywhere.
Full policy: https://fronesislabs.com/#privacy · Browse the full DCL Security Suite: hub.fronesislabs.com · Questions: support@fronesislabs.com
Related skills
dcl-prompt-firewall— Input-layer injection and jailbreak detectiondcl-sentinel-trace— PII redactiondcl-secret-leak-detector— Credential and API key scandcl-semantic-drift-guard— Hallucination and grounding check
Leibniz Layer™ · Fronesis Labs · fronesislabs.com
Questions people ask
- Does every call cost money?
- Yes — the live evaluate and audit tools are paid, ranging from $0.01 to $0.50 per call depending on the tool. A free instruction-only checklist is included for manual review with no network call.
- What does the output contain, and is the raw text stored?
- Each call returns verdict (COMMIT/NO_COMMIT), confidence, reason, tx_hash, chain_index, input_hash, policy_version, drift_mode, and drift_score. Only a hash of the evaluated text is written to the audit chain — the raw response is never persisted server-side.
- Can I target a specific policy per item?
- The single-item evaluate tools do not accept a policy parameter; each one runs its own built-in policy. To pick a policy per item, use dcl_evaluate_batch, where each item may carry a policy string such as default, strict, anti_jailbreak, safety, or content_quality.
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