设计与多媒体

security-threat-model

试用

基于仓库代码产出针对性的应用安全威胁模型,含信任边界、滥用路径与缓解建议。

它能做什么

读取仓库或指定子路径,从代码中提取组件、数据存储、外部集成、入口点以及它们之间的信任边界,再据此建模。每条威胁都写成绑定具体资产的滥用路径,用定性可能性与影响评级,并结合已有控制措施调整优先级。出报告前会先向用户确认 1–3 个关键问题(部署方式、暴露面、认证授权、数据敏感度),未确认的假设会让相关建议标注为有条件。最终输出一个 Markdown 文件,文件名取自仓库根目录或范围内目录。

什么时候用它

  • 安全评审前给服务做威胁建模
  • 梳理上传、解析等入口的滥用路径
  • 为负责的子目录记录信任边界
  • 把架构摘要转成有证据支撑的分级威胁清单

技能文档

Threat Model Source Code Repo

Deliver an actionable AppSec-grade threat model that is specific to the repository or a project path, not a generic checklist. Anchor every architectural claim to evidence in the repo and keep assumptions explicit. Prioritizing realistic attacker goals and concrete impacts over generic checklists.

Quick start

  1. Collect (or infer) inputs:
  • Repo root path and any in-scope paths.
  • Intended usage, deployment model, internet exposure, and auth expectations (if known).
  • Any existing repository summary or architecture spec.
  • Use prompts in references/prompt-template.md to generate a repository summary.
  • Follow the required output contract in references/prompt-template.md. Use it verbatim when possible.

Workflow

1) Scope and extract the system model

  • Identify primary components, data stores, and external integrations from the repo summary.
  • Identify how the system runs (server, CLI, library, worker) and its entrypoints.
  • Separate runtime behavior from CI/build/dev tooling and from tests/examples.
  • Map the in-scope locations to those components and exclude out-of-scope items explicitly.
  • Do not claim components, flows, or controls without evidence.

2) Derive boundaries, assets, and entry points

  • Enumerate trust boundaries as concrete edges between components, noting protocol, auth, encryption, validation, and rate limiting.
  • List assets that drive risk (data, credentials, models, config, compute resources, audit logs).
  • Identify entry points (endpoints, upload surfaces, parsers/decoders, job triggers, admin tooling, logging/error sinks).

3) Calibrate assets and attacker capabilities

  • List the assets that drive risk (credentials, PII, integrity-critical state, availability-critical components, build artifacts).
  • Describe realistic attacker capabilities based on exposure and intended usage.
  • Explicitly note non-capabilities to avoid inflated severity.

4) Enumerate threats as abuse paths

  • Prefer attacker goals that map to assets and boundaries (exfiltration, privilege escalation, integrity compromise, denial of service).
  • Classify each threat and tie it to impacted assets.
  • Keep the number of threats small but high quality.

5) Prioritize with explicit likelihood and impact reasoning

  • Use qualitative likelihood and impact (low/medium/high) with short justifications.
  • Set overall priority (critical/high/medium/low) using likelihood x impact, adjusted for existing controls.
  • State which assumptions most influence the ranking.

6) Validate service context and assumptions with the user

  • Summarize key assumptions that materially affect threat ranking or scope, then ask the user to confirm or correct them.
  • Ask 1–3 targeted questions to resolve missing context (service owner and environment, scale/users, deployment model, authn/authz, internet exposure, data sensitivity, multi-tenancy).
  • Pause and wait for user feedback before producing the final report.
  • If the user declines or can’t answer, state which assumptions remain and how they influence priority.

7) Recommend mitigations and focus paths

  • Distinguish existing mitigations (with evidence) from recommended mitigations.
  • Tie mitigations to concrete locations (component, boundary, or entry point) and control types (authZ checks, input validation, schema enforcement, sandboxing, rate limits, secrets isolation, audit logging).
  • Prefer specific implementation hints over generic advice (e.g., "enforce schema at gateway for upload payloads" vs "validate inputs").
  • Base recommendations on validated user context; if assumptions remain unresolved, mark recommendations as conditional.

8) Run a quality check before finalizing

  • Confirm all discovered entrypoints are covered.
  • Confirm each trust boundary is represented in threats.
  • Confirm runtime vs CI/dev separation.
  • Confirm user clarifications (or explicit non-responses) are reflected.
  • Confirm assumptions and open questions are explicit.
  • Confirm that the format of the report matches closely the required output format defined in prompt template: references/prompt-template.md
  • Write the final Markdown to a file named -threat-model.md (use the basename of the repo root, or the in-scope directory if you were asked to model a subpath).

Risk prioritization guidance (illustrative, not exhaustive)

  • High: pre-auth RCE, auth bypass, cross-tenant access, sensitive data exfiltration, key or token theft, model or config integrity compromise, sandbox escape.
  • Medium: targeted DoS of critical components, partial data exposure, rate-limit bypass with measurable impact, log/metrics poisoning that affects detection.
  • Low: low-sensitivity info leaks, noisy DoS with easy mitigation, issues requiring unlikely preconditions.

References

  • Output contract and full prompt template: references/prompt-template.md
  • Optional controls/asset list: references/security-controls-and-assets.md

Only load the reference files you need. Keep the final result concise, grounded, and reviewable.

常见问题

需要先准备架构文档吗?
不需要,可以直接从仓库推断输入;如果已有仓库摘要或架构说明也可以提供。没有摘要时,它会用 references/prompt-template.md 里的提示词先生成一份。
输出会不会只是一份通用安全检查清单?
不会。文档要求每条架构判断都必须有仓库中的证据支撑,威胁要写成绑定具体资产和边界的滥用路径,通用清单被明确降权,优先考虑现实攻击者目标与具体影响。
最终交付物是什么形式?
一个简洁的 Markdown 威胁模型文件,命名为 <basename>-threat-model.md,格式遵循 references/prompt-template.md 中的输出约定。报告会区分有证据的现有缓解措施和建议新增的缓解措施,并说明哪些假设对排序影响最大。
什么情况下不该用它?
它只用于明确的威胁建模请求,比如对代码库或路径建模、枚举威胁与滥用路径、做应用安全威胁建模。通用架构总结、代码审查和非安全向的设计工作不在范围内。

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